Der "innere Gerichtshof" der Vernunft : Normativitat, Rationalitat und Gewissen in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants und im Deutschen Idealismus /
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The 11 contributions in Der "innere Gerichtshof" der Vernunft: Normativität, Rationalität und Gewissen in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants und im Deutschen Idealismus explore Immanuel Kant's description of the human conscience as an "internal court of justice". Kant's theory of conscience is discussed in the context of practical philosophy, philosophy of religion and its historical development after Kant, especially in Hegel's philosophy. Approaching general concepts such as \'normativity\' and \'rationality\' from the perspective of Kantian philosophy and German Idealism, the book goes beyond the limited scope of contemporary theories of action that often take these concepts for granted. In particular, Kant's theory of conscience invites different perspectives that are both critical and more fruitful.
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Includes index. :
1 online resource. :
9789004327191 :
1878-9986 ; :
Available to subscribing member institutions only.
Kant on conscience : a unified approach to moral self-consciousness /
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In Kant on Conscience Emre Kazim offers the first systematic treatment of Kant's theory of conscience. Contrary to the scholarly consensus, Kazim argues that Kant's various discussions of conscience - as practical reason, as a feeling, as a power, as a court, as judgement, as the voice of God, et cetera - are philosophically coherent aspects of the same unified thing ('Unity Thesis'). Through conceptual reconstruction and historical contextualisation of the primary texts, Kazim both presents Kant's notion of conscience as it relates to his critical thought and philosophically evaluates the coherence of his various claims. In light of this, Kazim shows the central role that conscience plays in the understanding of Kantian ethics as a whole.
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1 online resource. :
Includes bibliographical references and index. :
9789004340664 :
2211-2014 ; :
Available to subscribing member institutions only.